University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Retributive Justifications for Jail Diversion of
Individuals with Mental Disorder
E. Lea Johnston
University of Florida Levin College of Law, johnstonl@law.ufl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
E. Lea Johnston, Retributive Justifications for Jail Diversion of Individuals with Mental Disorder, 35 Behav. Sci. & Law (forthcoming 2017),
available at

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
averyle@law.ufl.edu, kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

35 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW __ (2017).

Retributive Justifications for Jail Diversion of Individuals with Mental Disorder
E. Lea Johnston
Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 309 Village Drive, PO
Box 117620, Gainesville, FL 32611; email: JohnstonL@law.ufl.edu; phone: 352-2730794; fax: 352-392-3005 1

Abstract Jail diversion programs have proliferated across the United States as a means to
decrease the incarceration of individuals with mental illnesses. These programs include
pre-adjudication initiatives, such as Crisis Intervention Teams, as well as post-adjudication
programs, such as mental health courts and specialized probationary services. Postadjudication programs often operate at the point of sentencing, so their comportment with
criminal justice norms is crucial. This article investigates whether and under what
circumstances post-adjudication diversion for offenders with serious mental illnesses may
cohere with principles of retributive justice. Key tenets of retributive theory are that
punishments must not be inhumane and that their severity must be proportionate to an
offender’s desert. Three retributive rationales could justify jail diversion for offenders with
serious mental illnesses: reduced culpability, the avoidance of inhumane punishment, and
the achievement of punishment of equal impact with similarly situated offenders. The
article explores current proposals to effectuate these rationales, their manifestations in law,
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and how these considerations may impact decisions to divert individuals with serious
mental illnesses from jail to punishment in the community.
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In response to burgeoning numbers of offenders with serious mental illnesses and
the spiraling cost of incarcerative care for this population, jurisdictions across the United
States have launched diversion programs aimed at shunting offenders away from jails and
into community treatment (Redlich, Steadman, Robbins & Swanson, 2006; Skeem,
Manchak, & Peterson, 2011). These programs include pre-adjudication initiatives, such as
police-based responses to individuals with mental illnesses, as well as post-adjudication
programs, such as mental health courts and specialized probationary services. Postadjudication programs often operate at the point of sentencing, so the degree to which they
comport with principles of justice is important. Retributive principles of just deserts and
proportionate punishment animate the sentencing codes of many, if not most, jurisdictions.
Three retributive rationales could justify jail diversion for offenders with serious mental
illnesses: reduced culpability, the avoidance of inhumane punishment, and the achievement
of punishment of equal impact. 2
Punishment, Retributivism, and Proportionality
To understand how mental disorder may warrant a disposition other than
incarceration under retributive theory, it is first necessary to lay some theoretical
groundwork. For centuries, philosophers have struggled to justify the state’s power to
punish wrongdoers and the relative distribution of punishment among offenders (Von
Hirsch, 1990, pp. 259–260). Agreement on the precise definition of “punishment” is
elusive, (Bagaric, 2016, pp. 45–48), but, broadly speaking, criminal punishment involves

2

Much of Part C of this article is drawn from E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and
Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
147 (2013) and E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing: The Case of
Seriously Disordered Offenders, 63 CATH. U.L. REV. 625 (2014).
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the state’s imposition of a typically unpleasant condition on an individual in response to
that individual’s violation of a legal rule (Duff, 2001, pp. xiv–xv; Hart, 1968, pp. 4–5; Von
Hirsch, 1976, p. 35). Critically, the principles that justify the state’s power to impose
punishment may differ from those that control the distribution of punishment—the type
and quantity of punishment the state should order a particular offender to suffer for a
particular crime relative to the penalties other offenders should receive for their offenses
(Hart, 1968, p. 4).
Retribution, one of several traditional justifications for punishment, animates the
sentencing codes of many jurisdictions (Frase, 2005, p. 76 n. 22; Robinson, 2008, pp. 145–
146). There are numerous strands of retributivism, (Berman, 2012; Cottingham, 1979), but
one dominant viewpoint holds that state-imposed punishment expresses blame or censure
(Feinberg, 1970, p. 98; Hudson, 2003, p. 47). According to some expressive perspectives,
the hard treatment inherent in a criminal sanction should reflect the degree of censure
appropriate for an offender’s blameworthiness (Duff, 2001, p. 132). This viewpoint
inspired the development of just desert theory, which rose to prominence in the late 1970s
as a means of curtailing sentencing discretion and bounding the state’s coercive power
(Kellogg, 1978). This theory, propounded most thoroughly and effectively by Professor
Andrew von Hirsch, 3 allocates punishment according to a proportionality equation
involving culpability, seriousness of harm, and severity of penalty (Von Hirsch &
Ashworth, 2005, p. 4).

3

Von Hirsch developed and refined his sentencing theory over the course of four
books: Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 35 (1976), Past or Future Crimes:
Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals (1985), Censure and
Sanctions (1993), and, with Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the
Principles (2005).
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Although philosophers have long distinguished “punishment” as an intentional
deprivation of liberty from “its accessories,” which include both the foreseeable and
unforeseeable consequences of such deprivation, (Bedau, 2001, pp. 111–112; Mabbott,
1939, p. 165), a number of scholars have recently argued that the state should be morally
responsible for the foreseeable results of its punitive actions (Johnston, 2013, pp. 190–191;
Kolber, 2009, pp. 185–186). Foreseeable, but unintentional, consequences could include,
for example, the degeneration of an individual’s mental health while confined in
segregation, the exacerbation of preexisting health conditions, emotional distress, or even
victimization by larger and stronger inmates. Just desert theory measures a penalty’s
severity by how the sanction typically affects an offender’s interests and quality of life
from the perspective of the typical offender (Von Hirsch, 1993, p. 35). Thus, just desert
theory relies upon an understanding of punishment broad enough to encompass at least
foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm, proximately caused by the state in the context
of incarceration (Johnston, 2013, p. 186, pp. 218–219; Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p.
176).
According to just desert theory, three requirements must be satisfied for a penalty
to properly reflect the degree of censure warranted by an offense (Von Hirsch, 1990, pp.
278–279). First, criminal sanctions must take a punitive form, such as a deprivation of
liberty or property, so that deprivations are imposed in a manner that expresses censure or
blame (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 135). Second, the severity of a sanction should
convey the degree of the intended censure (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 135). Finally,
to effectuate the second requirement, punitive sanctions should reflect “ordinal
proportionality;” that is, they “should be arrayed according to the degree of

5
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blameworthiness (i.e., seriousness) of the conduct.” (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, pp.
138–141). Blameworthiness is an amalgamation of the harm caused by an offense and the
offender’s culpability in effecting that harm (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005).
Three aspects of ordinal proportionality warrant emphasis. First, ordinal
proportionality demands parity: individuals convicted of crimes of comparable seriousness
should receive penalties of comparable severity (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, pp. 139–
140). Such offenders need not receive the same punishment, but they should receive
penalties of substantially the same degree of onerousness (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005,
pp. 139–140). For example, if simple assault were considered roughly as serious as a theft
of $200 to $2,000, offenders who commit either crime should receive penalties of roughly
the same severity, perhaps probation for three to six months. Second, penalties should be
ordered so that their relative severity reflects the degree of seriousness of their
corresponding crimes (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 140). For example, offenders
should receive a more serious penalty for committing murder than a property offense.
Finally, penalties should be spaced so that the difference between two penalties’
onerousness mirrors and calls attention to the difference between two crimes’ seriousness
(Von Hirsch, 1976, p. 90). In addition, the overall magnitude and anchoring points of a
penalty system are established by “cardinal magnitudes,” the absolute severity levels that
must be chosen for certain crimes (Johnston, 2013, pp. 209–210).
This proportionality scheme supplies the necessary structure for assessing how
mental illness may factor into the allocation and distribution of punishment (Johnston,
2013). The following sections explore three retributive rationales that could support jail
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diversion for offenders with serious mental illnesses: reduced culpability, the avoidance of
inhumane punishment, and the achievement of punishment of equal impact. 4
Reduction of Culpability
When symptoms of mental illness at the time of the crime diminish an offender’s
culpability, a judge should reduce the length or severity of her punishment. Ordinal aspects
of the proportionality axiom dictate that less blameworthy offenders receive less
punishment than more culpable offenders for effecting the same harm. An individual’s
culpability depends on her level of personal responsibility for her conduct. Serious mental
illness at the time of an offense may serve as a mitigating factor to the extent that the
offender had a reduced ability to understand the nature of her acts or their wrongfulness, a
reduced ability to control her actions, or a diminished capacity to form the necessary mens
rea for a crime.
Legal theorists have long wrestled with which effects of mental illness warrant
mitigation of punishment. One leading theory asserts that mental illness reduces culpability
to the extent it results in irrationality (Moore, 1984, pp. 372–373). Stephen Morse (1997)
argues that rationality “is the most general, important prerequisite to being morally
responsible” and that, to merit criminal punishment, an individual must have “the general
capacity to understand and to be guided by the reasons that support a moral prohibition that
we accept” (pp. 24–25). Morse identifies two forms of irrationality: an individual may be
“unable rationally to comprehend the facts that bear on the morality of [her] action or [be]

4

Importantly, this article assumes that offenders are competent to plead guilty and
be sentenced. It also assumes that offenders are culpable, i.e. they should not be spared
punishment on grounds of insanity (or actual innocence). These assumptions, while
perhaps questionable in the context of individuals with serious mental illnesses who are
subject to diversion, are beyond the scope of this article.
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unable rationally to comprehend the applicable moral or legal code” (p. 25). Society, Morse
(1996) submits, cannot reasonably demand that a person obey rules she is incapable of
following or understanding (p. 530). When obedience to the law is thus beyond a person’s
cognitive capacities, punishment is an unfair and inappropriate means of addressing the
offender’s behavior (Morse, 1996, p. 530).
In addition, some scholars have argued that mental illness may reduce culpability
to the extent it renders a person incapable of controlling her behavior at the time of a crime
(Moore, 1984, p. 374). For example, Morse (1994) hypothesizes that mental disorder may
result in internal duress, whereby the offender is unable to resist the demands of her psyche
(pp. 1619–1620). Mental conditions capable of exerting such extraordinary psychophysical pressure include compulsive disorders, which traditionally have been
conceptualized as involving volitional or control deficiencies (Morse, 1994, pp. 1620–
1621; Morse, 1997, p. 29). However, Morse ultimately finds that distinguishing between
internal duress and irrationality may be unnecessary, as most cases of the former are best
understood as instances of the latter (Morse, 1994, p. 1624; Morse, 2003, p. 295). Similarly,
Christopher Slobogin (2000) argues that the concept of “controllessness” captures
blamelessness from reduced rationality, affective appreciation, and volitionality (pp.
1237─1238). To measure the extent to which an individual’s mental disorder meaningfully
reduced her culpability, Slobogin advocates that triers of fact should consider mental illness
as part of the traditional inquiry into whether a criminal offender had the required mens rea
or a justification or excuse for the crime (pp. 1238–1239).
While much ink has been spilt on which mental conditions so eviscerate culpability
as to warrant acquittal, little attention has been paid to the effect partial culpability should
8
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have on the allocation of punishment. Partial culpability could be conceptualized as a
partial excuse (which reduces the grade of an offense) or a mitigating excuse (which merely
carries sentencing consequences) (Wasik, 1982, pp. 524–525). Recognizing that
irrationality warrants lessened criminal responsibility, Herbert Fingarette and Ann
Fingarette Hasse (1979) have proposed a “partial disability of mind” defense calling for
mitigation when the finder of fact concludes that the defendant lacked the mental capacity
for rational conduct in relation to the criminal significance of her act and where that lack
of capacity “played a material role but not the chief or the predominant role in the
defendant’s commission of the alleged criminal act” (p. 265). A jury’s finding of “partial
disability of the mind” would not affect the defendant’s degree of criminal liability but
would require the sentencing judge to mitigate the defendant’s punishment within her
discretion (Fingarette & Hasse, 1979, p. 245).
Recently, several scholars have argued that a finding of partial culpability on
account of mental illness should result in a standardized punishment discount or perhaps a
reduction in the grade of the offense or a general adjustment in a state’s sentencing
guideline system (Robinson, 2011, pp. 308-309). For example, inspired by Fingarette and
Hasse, Morse (2003) has advocated for the adoption of a “partial responsibility” defense
that would grant a fixed punishment discount upon a jury’s finding that, “at the time of the
crime, the defendant suffered from substantially diminished rationality for which the
defendant was not responsible and which substantially affected the defendant’s criminal
conduct” (p. 300). Morse argues that the penalty discount should be inversely related to
crime seriousness and that, to parallel the defendant’s substantially diminished powers of
rationality, the discount should also be substantial, perhaps of the order of 50% (Morse,
9
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2003, p. 303; Morse, 2011). Other scholars have argued, however, that diminished
responsibility is best assessed during sentencing, as opposed to the guilt phase as Morse
recommends (Arenella, 1977; Slobogin, 1985; Wasik, 1982).
More recently, Mirko Bagaric (2016) has proposed that any offender who had a
mental impairment at the time of the offense should receive a penalty discount of around
10% on account of her reduced culpability. Bagaric argues that a penalty reduction is
necessary because all mental disorders to some degree reduce individuals’ capacities “to
exercise sound judgment and make sensible choices” and thus diminish blameworthiness
(p. 35). 5 He asserts the penalty should be small, however, because these offenders were not
acquitted on grounds of insanity and thus presumably understood the wrongfulness of their
acts and had the requisite mens rea for the crime (pp. 35–38). Bagaric argues that sentencers
should assume the existence of a nexus between a mental disorder and a criminal act given
the difficulty of ascertaining causation and the contested nature of this subject in criminal
law (pp. 38–39).
Increased Foreseeable Severity of Sentence
Serious mental illness also increases the foreseeable hardship that a sanction—in
particular, incarceration—will exert (Johnston, 2013; Johnston, 2014). Confinement within
the general prison population can be seriously damaging for an inmate with a serious
mental illness. The default rule followed by many state correctional agencies, as well as
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, is to house inmates with mental disorders within the general

5

Importantly, many people with mental illnesses are fully functional and maintain
rationality. The justification for sentencing mitigation may be considerably stronger for
individuals with serious mental illnesses who suffer from serious cognitive impairments
and are more susceptible to victimization.
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prison population at the appropriate security level (Human Rights Watch, 2003). This
arrangement may be appropriate for those individuals with diagnosed mental illnesses who
are fully functional, maintain rationality, and are able to fare reasonably well in penal
environments. Indeed, this housing arrangement could facilitate equality of opportunity,
full participation in programs, and independent living for some individuals with mental
illnesses (Anderson, 1999). However, housing in the general population can be quite
hazardous for individuals with serious mental illnesses who are vulnerable to irrationality,
impaired functioning, and risk of victimization.
Individuals with mental illnesses often do not receive mental health treatment in
carceral facilities (Human Rights Watch, 2015; James & Glaze, 2006 (finding that, of
inmates with a mental health problem, only 33.8% of state prisoners, 24.0% of federal
prisoners, and 17.5% of jail inmates reported receiving mental health treatment since
admission)). When individuals do receive treatment, they are most likely to receive
medication (Adams & Ferrandino, 2008, p. 922; James & Glaze, 2006). Given their cost,
older psychiatric medications are the treatment modality of choice (Human Rights Watch,
2003). Large studies and meta-analyses have found that some traditional antipsychotic
medications may be as effective as certain second-generation antipsychotic treatments in
reducing symptoms, although with different side effects and adherence patterns in
community settings (Keefe et al., 2007; Leucht et al., 2009; Swartz et al., 2007). For
individuals for whom older medications are insufficiently effective—or who cannot
tolerate their side effects—jails and prisons may offer few options. Although the vast
majority of prisons report providing some form of psychotherapy or counseling, (Beck &
Maruschak, 2001, p. 2), they must limit their distribution of this expensive service

11

35 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW __ (2017).

(National Institute of Corrections of the U.S. Department of Justice, 2001, pp. 4–5).
Consequently, many inmates do not receive the therapy that they need to cope effectively
in prison 6 (James & Glaze, 2006).
Prison poses other, more acute dangers as well. Unable sufficiently to assess danger
and modify their behavior to ward off attacks, individuals with serious mental illnesses are
more prone to physical and sexual victimization than non-disordered individuals (Beck,
Berzofsky, Caspar, & Krebs, 2013; Johnston, 2013). In addition, strict compliance with
prison rules can be difficult for individuals with mental and behavioral limitations, and
prisoners with serious mental illnesses are more likely than non-disordered prisoners to
violate prison rules (Human Rights Watch, 2015, pp. 29–30; Johnston, 2013). As a result,
seriously mentally ill prisoners are disproportionately punished in segregation (Human
Rights Watch, 2015, pp. 32–33; Johnston, 2013). These inmates may also be housed in
isolation as a means of protection (Johnston, 2014). Evidence suggests that—depending on
duration and conditions of confinement (O’Keefe et al., 2013)—individuals with serious
mental disorders housed in segregation are especially susceptible to deterioration,
psychotic break, and suicide ideation (Human Rights Watch, 2015, pp. 33–34; Johnston,
2013; Shames, Wilcox & Subramanian, 2015, p. 17).

6

It should be noted, however, that, for many offenders, prison offers an opportunity
to receive mental health care that they were not receiving in the community (Lamb &
Weinberger, 2005, p. 531; Torrey, 1995, p. 1611). Other sentencing options—including
those provided by specialized probation and mental health courts—may be more treatmentfriendly than jails and prisons.
12
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Thus, the sanction of incarceration may be markedly, and foreseeably, harsher for
an individual with serious mental illness than for a non-ill offender. 7 However, this author
has cautioned:
[t]o warrant sentencing accommodation, an offender with a serious mental
illness may need to make a particularized showing that harm is probable in
his case. In many instances an individualized showing of likelihood of
serious harm will be possible given prior patterns of behavior, a personal
history of abuse, and a constellation of other risk factors that can be brought
to a judge’s attention at a sentencing hearing
(Johnston, 2013, 180–181). For some individuals with serious mental illnesses, factoring
this degree of severity into the proportionality equation should result in the selection of a
non-carceral sentence. Diversion may be necessary to avoid an inhumane punishment or
achieve rough parity in the impact of punishment with similarly situated non-ill offenders
(Johnston, 2013, pp. 207–220; Johnston, 2014, pp. 643–647).
Inhumane Punishment
A retributive understanding of punishment suggests a sentencing system should
consider an offender’s foreseeable hardship in order to avoid imposing an inhumane
punishment. Premised upon respect for the moral dignity and personhood of the offender,
(Murphy, 1973, pp. 229–231), retributivism will not tolerate punishments that violate
human dignity, (Murphy, 1979, p. 233), fail to recognize the personality of offenders, or
“approximate a system of sheer terror in which human beings are treated as animals to be
intimidated and prodded” (Morris, 1968, p. 488).

7

It is admittedly difficult to establish and defend the risk profile of a generalized
“non-ill” offender, as characteristics beyond mental illness contribute to vulnerability to
harm. (National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, 2009).
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Determining when, exactly, a mode of punishment or conditions associated with a
particular sanction cross the line from harsh to inhumane is a difficult contextual question
ultimately reflecting the sensitivities and values of a particular society (Garland, 1991, p.
143; Kleinig, 1973, p. 123). While corporal punishment was once commonplace, much of
the civilized world now rejects corporal sanctions, such as whipping and lashing, as
inhumane (Garland, 1991, p. 143; Khullar, 2010, pp. 187–188). The same holds true for
sanctions intended profoundly to disrupt one’s personality or senses or to precipitate mental
crisis (Reyes, 2007, pp. 594–616). Philosophers, legal scholars, and courts distinguish
incarceration from corporal sanctions by emphasizing the former’s primary function as a
deprivation of rights (Mabbott, 1955, p. 257). However, a sentence of incarceration that
carries an unacceptably high likelihood of victimization or psychological harm for a
vulnerable inmate may more closely resemble an inhumane corporal penalty than an
unobjectionable deprivation of rights (Dolovich, 2009, pp. 915–916). If this is true, then,
when the foreseeable risk of serious physical or psychological harm in jail or prison
surpasses an acceptable threshold, incarceration under a certain set of conditions should no
longer be a permissible punishment option, and the sentencing judge should select a
community punishment.
Indeed, in order to maintain the authority to punish, the state holds an obligation to
tend to the offender’s basic needs and provide an environment conducive to her mental
health. Providing the conditions necessary to allow an individual to understand the message
of punishment is part and parcel of recognizing the humanity of the defendant and treating
her as a moral, autonomous agent (Duff, 2001, pp. 129–130). As Professors Dan Markel
and Chad Flanders (2010) observed, to the extent that the state “breaks” an offender, or

14
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renders her incapable of understanding her punishment as punishment, the state forfeits its
right to punish that individual (pp. 957–958). Thus, the state has the duty—from the
moment a punishment is imposed to the moment it is completed—to ensure that a
defendant’s mental health remains sufficiently intact to allow her to understand and
appreciate her punishment. If an individual is likely to suffer significant mental
deterioration in a carceral facility—and a community sanction would facilitate treatment
and allow for an appropriately severe sentence given the offender’s crime—then the judge
should select the alternative sanction (Johnston, 2013, p. 197).
Equal Impact
When incarceration would be significantly more onerous—but not inhumane—for
a member of a vulnerable population, Professors von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth have
argued the individual should receive an adjusted sentence as a means to avoid
disproportionate penal severity. The principle of equal impact holds that, “when an
offender suffers from certain handicaps that would make his punishment significantly more
onerous, the sanction should be adjusted in order to avoid its having an undue differential
impact on him” (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 172). This principle derives from ideals
of fairness and equality and is closely related to a principle of nondiscrimination (Ashworth
& Player, 1998). At its essence, the equal-impact principle calls for members of certain
vulnerable classes to receive penalties of roughly equivalent severity as nonvulnerable
individuals. It is important to emphasize that the equal-impact principle does not call for a
reduction in punishment, but rather for equalizing the severity of penalties imposed on
equally blameworthy offenders (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 173). While scholars
originally conceptualized the equal-impact principle as standing outside the bounds of
15
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proportionality, (Ashworth, 1983, p. 275), desert theorists have argued that, at least in some
cases, recognition of the equal-impact principle is necessary for the achievement of
proportionality (Ashworth & Player, 1998, p. 255; Ashworth & Roberts, 2009, pp. 345–
346; Von Hirsch, 2009, p. 328).
While the equal-impact principle may also apply to onerous sanctions such as
community service or intensive probation, scholars typically raise the principle within the
context of incarceration (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, pp. 172–173). Concerned about
the foreseeable impairment of interests critical to offenders’ quality of life, scholars have
suggested—though without robust analysis—that adjusted sentences would be appropriate
to effectuate proportionate punishment for individuals with mental illness, (Ashworth,
2010, p. 100; Ashworth & Player, 1998, p. 255), individuals with physical disabilities,
(Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005), and elderly persons (Ashworth & Player, 1998, pp. 259–
260; Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 176). Scholars have also argued for categorical
youth discounts to reflect incarceration’s infringement upon important developmental
interests and the likelihood of impairing juveniles’ self-esteem (Ashworth, 2009, p. 300;
Von Hirsch, 2009, p. 323; Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, pp. 42–43).
Application of the equal-impact principle in the context of serious mental illness is
appropriate because incarceration affects the interests of offenders with serious mental
illnesses and non-ill offenders differently. For example, incarceration typically deprives a
standard prisoner of privacy and autonomy by restricting the individual’s ability to choose
her activities and associates. When the offender has a major mental illness, however, she
may suffer a much more extreme loss of autonomy due to the deterioration of her mental
integrity. The ultimate result of a carceral term (particularly of a long term) may be highly
16
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degrading, corroding her rationality and perhaps threatening her capacity for autonomous
thought. As compared to non-ill offenders, the likely psychological toll of incarceration on
offenders with major mental illnesses impedes a broader, more substantial set of interests
and affects these interests to a more significant degree. In addition, offenders with serious
mental illnesses have an interest in receiving mental health treatment to retain or recover
their mental functioning and autonomy. As juveniles have certain developmental interests
that make imprisonment uniquely hard for them, (Von Hirsch, 2009, p. 327), offenders
with serious mental illnesses have health-related interests that are also negatively impacted
by incarceration. These interests include receiving regular and adequate mental health
treatment in a nurturing environment in which they can develop a relationship of trust with
a mental health provider in order to function at an adequate level. As previously noted,
mental health care in prison is often inadequate, and the environment is far from
therapeutic. Under the equal-impact principle, if incarceration is more onerous when
undergone by offenders with serious mental illnesses, proportionality principles may
require that judges reject standard terms of incarceration for this population. To avoid
disproportionality, judges could select a noncarceral sanction of roughly equivalent
punitive bite.
To identify sanctions of equivalent punitive bite or onerousness, Professors von
Hirsch and Ashworth have proposed using the “living standard analysis” developed by von
Hirsch and Professor Nils Jareborg (1991) in the context of evaluating the severity of
criminal offenses. A living standard analysis focuses on “the means or capabilities for
achieving a certain quality of life,” (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 194), and compares
the severity of various penalties by their degree of intrusion into offenders’ interests (Von
17
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Hirsch, 2009, p. 146). In essence, penalties that typically impair interests more critical to
quality of life (such as physical integrity) will be considered more severe than those that
affect less significant interests (such as privacy) (Von Hirsch, 2009, p. 146). Similarly, a
penalty that typically threatens individuals’ very subsistence will be understood as more
severe than one that infringes upon their well-being to a lesser extent (Von Hirsch, 2009,
p. 146). Thus, penalties’ severities can be compared objectively by the extent to which the
sanctions interfere with offenders’ interests or with resources to which offenders have
legitimate claims (Von Hirsch, 2009, p. 327). Penalties may affect multiple dimensions of
human welfare, including physical integrity, freedom of movement, choice of activity and
associates, material support and amenities, freedom from degrading treatment, future
earning power, privacy, and autonomy8 (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 147).
Von Hirsch and others have argued that a living standard analysis should reflect
“the means and capabilities that ordinarily assist persons in achieving a good life” and
should not vary according to individuals’ preferences or subjective perceptions of pain
(Von Hirsch, 1993, p. 35). They articulate two main reasons for confining the living
standard analysis to the “typical” offender: first, individualizing the standard would create
unmanageable diversity (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 188); and, second, “when one
is talking about atypical harms, foreseeability diminishes,” (Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005,
p. 189). Although scholars to date have focused largely on the average offender, when
empirical evidence establishes that a given penalty will affect the interests of an

8

This list was not derived from “deep theory,” but rather from “impressions of the
main kinds of concerns that seem typically involved in victimizing crimes” and penalties
(Von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 205). Accordingly, some scholars have criticized the
list as arbitrary (Czbanski, 2007, p. 67; Bagaric & McConvill, 2005, p. 59).
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identifiable, vulnerable offender class more substantially than average offenders, strong
arguments exist for conducting a separate analysis for individuals in that class. Indeed, just
desert theorists have indicated a willingness to perform living standard analyses in
“nonstandard cases” by assessing “typical impacts for the members of that group” (Von
Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005, p. 173 note f).
Translating this theory into more concrete and predictable terms, Bagaric (2016)
has proposed granting a substantial sentencing discount to offenders with mental illnesses
who are likely to find a sanction especially burdensome (pp. 41–50). Analogizing the plight
of incarcerated individuals with mental illnesses to those of offenders housed in supermax
conditions, (pp. 41–43), Bagaric argues that—“when an offender’s condition suggests that
he or she will suffer considerably more than other prisoners”—sentencing judges should
consider granting a penalty discount in the range of 50% (pp. 43–44). This substantial
discount, which would be additive to the ten percent discount for offenders who acted while
disordered, (p. 50), is dictated by principles of retributive justice and proportionality (p.
49) (“Given that mentally-impaired offenders often suffer more as a result of being
subjected to criminal sanctions, it follows that proportionality requires this to be factored
into sentencing. Thus, offenders with mental impairment should be accorded a sentencing
discount if the sanction is likely to set back their interests more than those of other
offenders.”). Bagaric contends that “[o]ffenders should only receive a mental health
discount when it is established that their condition would demonstrably worsen as a result
of incarceration, or they would be disproportionately adversely impacted by the prison
experience compared to other prisoners” (pp. 48–49). In addition to serving to shorten
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terms of incarceration, this analysis should apply to the threshold decision of what kind of
sanction to impose and thus would militate toward diversion (p. 50).
Conclusion
At least three retributive rationales support the diversion of offenders with serious
mental illnesses from jail to a community sanction such as probation. First, serious mental
illness at the time of the crime may diminish an offender’s culpability and thus should
reduce the severity of her punishment. Second, considering the foreseeable consequences
of incarceration for individuals with serious mental illnesses, diversion may be necessary
to avoid an inhumane punishment. Third, diversion may be necessary to achieve rough
parity in the impact of punishment with similarly situated non-ill offenders.
Retributive aims animate the sentencing codes of many states as well as the federal
system. Thus, it is not surprising that many mitigation statutes reflect these principles. For
instance, state statutes often allow judges, in their discretion, to reduce an offender’s
sentence length or alter her disposition on the basis of substantial or significant impairment
of the capacities to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform
to the law. (Parry, 2009, p. 149). 9 In addition, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (2016)
provide for a reduced sentence if a “significantly reduced mental capacity . . . contributed
substantially to the commission of the offense” and neither violence in the offense nor the
defendant’s criminal history indicates a need to protect the public (§ 5K2.13). An

9

In these states, the standard for acquittal on grounds of insanity will typically be
more demanding, for instance requiring that the defendant, because of a mental infirmity,
disease, or defect, “[d]id not know what he or she was doing or its consequences; or . . .
did not know that what he or she was doing was wrong.” (Florida Statutes Annotated,
2017, § 775.027(1)). Some states have opted to abolish the insanity defense altogether
and limit the consideration of mental illness to sentencing.
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application note defines “significantly reduced mental capacity” as indicating a
“significantly impaired ability to . . . understand the wrongfulness of the behavior
comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason or . . . control behavior that the
defendant knows is wrongful” (§ 5K2.13, app. n. 1).
In addition, at least a dozen jurisdictions recognize excessive offender hardship as
a mitigating factor (Johnston, 2014). Many state statutes frame the sentencing factor in
general, source-neutral terms and authorize judges to consider when imprisonment would
result in “undue” or “excessive” hardship for an offender (Johnston, 2014). Other states
specify that mitigation may be appropriate when the likely hardship stems from a specific
source. Illinois, for example, instructs a sentencing judge to consider, as a factor in favor
of withholding or minimizing a sentence of imprisonment, whether “the imprisonment of
the defendant would endanger his or her medical condition” (Illinois Comprehensive
Statutes Annotated, 2017, § 5/5-5-3.1(a)(12)). The District of Columbia, on the other hand,
allows a judge to sentence outside the voluntary sentencing guidelines if she determines
that the defendant, “by reason of obvious and substantial mental or physical impairment or
infirmity, cannot be adequately protected or treated in any available prison facility” (D.C.
Sentencing & Criminal Code Revision Commission, 2015, § 5.2.3(8)).
To the extent that they prioritize just deserts, jurisdictions should expand their
adoption and use of such mitigating factors in order to ensure that the punishment of
individuals with serious mental illnesses properly reflects their culpability, is not
inhumane, and is appropriately severe. Jail diversion is a justifiable response when
incarceration carries too great a risk of unjustifiable hardship or would pose too severe a
penalty given an offender’s desert.
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